Protect the systems people depend on.

Define the service before the technology

An electricity operator, port, fuel distributor, and hospital face different operational constraints. A general ambition to use AI becomes useful only when it is connected to a service responsibility and a decision someone is authorized to make.

For a fuel-supply exercise, identify the actual product, receiving location, essential demand, and delivery window. For a trade exercise, identify the cargo deadline and the handoff that a disruption could cause participants to miss. These choices determine which information is relevant.

A verified status update may be more useful than a large new data platform. The evaluation should make it possible to discover that a clearer procedure is the best intervention.

Build a trusted incident exchange

• Record the source, observation time, scope, and uncertainty of a report.
• Separate a confirmed interruption from an estimate, a disputed explanation, or a repeated account from the same source.
• Share the least sensitive information needed for the agreed civilian decision.
• Give recipients a way to challenge a report and receive a correction.
• Record who approved the response and whether the promised delivery or service outcome occurred.

Measure continuity and the cost of coordination

Planning speed is only one measure. An exercise should also examine essential deliveries completed, service interruption hours, unsuccessful collection trips, unnecessary rerouting, and burdens shifted to other communities.

Operators should test a participant disconnecting, conflicting notices, and the failure of the shared service. These conditions help determine whether cooperation strengthens independence or creates another point of dependence.

AI-generated summaries should retain links to underlying reports. Analysts need to verify material claims, especially when an apparently confident summary could conceal a provisional restoration estimate.

Related public-policy discussion

On 1 May 2024, Mark Warner and Thom Tillis announced the Secure Artificial Intelligence Act of 2024. Their proposal addressed information sharing and the reporting of AI security incidents, including a voluntary database for incidents and near misses. Read the Senate announcement.

This is relevant background for a discussion of traceable incident information. The proposal did not establish MAR, endorse Safe Nations, or demonstrate that any particular reporting arrangement improves civilian continuity. The MAR workflow above is Safe Nations’ own proposal.